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Bioethical issues that deal with medical decisions at the end of 
life are as interesting as they are contentious. Daily, we confront 
questions of health care rationing, medical futility, euthanasia, or 
the use of advanced directives and ethics committees. There is 
present-day mainstream thinking on these bioethical themes 
and more important, under-emphasized and controversial as-
pects of dying in America. 
Modem American bioethics originated in 1962 when Dr Belding 
Scribner developed the external vascular shunt that made renal 
dialysis possible. For the first time, patients otherwise doomed 
to die from renal failure could be treated effectively with 
hemodialysis. Because there were many more patients than 
dialysis machines, the University of Washington, where Dr 
Scribner worked, was forced to form an Admissions Committee 
to literally decide who would receive dialysis and live, and who 
would not and die. The seven anonymous lay members of the 
Committee-cynically dubbed the God Committee-dutifully 
selected candidates for the lifesaving procedure. Its methodol-
ogy and criteria for choosing from among "prostitutes, play-
boys, and poets" 1 were largely unknown. This was America's 
first ethics committee at work. 
American bioethics has matured much over the past 32 years, 
spurred in January 1980 by the formation of the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission studied 
medicolegal and ethical aspects of informed consent, brain 
death, human experimentation, access to care, and mental health. 
But its best known subject was medical treatment at life's end, 
which was authoritatively published in 1983 under the title 
"Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medi-
cal and Legal issues in Treatment Decisions."2 
As a discipline, bioethics currently attracts more than 2,000 
professionals who are drawn from the fields of medicine, law, 
theology, and the humanities. Bioethicists belong to societies 
such as the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics, and 
train at institutions like The Hastings Center in New York and 
The Kennedy Center for Bioethics in Washington DC. Leading 
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medical publications and specialized ethics journals, eg, The 
Hastings Center Report, regularly feature scholarly research, 
analysis, and editorials on a broad array of ethical issues. And at 
a practical level, about half of all health care facilities across the 
nation have formed ethics committees to help them solve 
patient-care moral dilemmas. 
American law, more so than philosophy, religion, or medi-
cine, has helped shape the development of American bioethics. 3 
Witness the proliferation of case-laws and statutes that attempt 
to define bioethical boundaries, beginning with the landmark 
case of In re Quinlan4 decided in 1976 by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. For the first time, a court of law was asked to 
rule on whether a patient in a persistently vegetative state could 
refuse mechanical ventilation, even if such refusal resulted in 
death. Calling it a privacy right that could be exercised on the 
patient's behalf by her parents, the court ruled that Karen Ann 
Quinlan's self-determination interest outweighed any real or 
theoretical opposing interests of her doctors, the hospital, and 
the State of New Jersey. The decision favored patient autonomy 
over medical paternalism; more significantly, it injected the law 
into a clinical arena previously within the exclusive domain of 
the medical profession. 
Subsequent cases before the courts in states like California, 
Massachusetts, Florida, New York, and Missouri have contin-
ued the trend of deciding in favor of the family's wishes to 
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. 2•5 On June 26,1990, 
the U.S. Supreme C.ourt decided its first right-to-die case in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 6 Stating 
that " ... a competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment..." the 
court went on to characterize artificial fluids and nutrition as a 
form of medical treatment that could be refused. The Cruzan 
court also held that states may promulgate a standard that there 
be clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes before a 
surrogate decision-maker can authorize the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment. 
Legislation on patient care issues has also been intense in the 
past two decades. Virtually all states now have statutes on living 
wills, informed consent, durable powers of attorney, brain 
death, and assisted suicide. Federal laws also regulate health 
care decisions; examples are edicts governing the treatment of 
disabilities including AIDs and anti-dumping laws. 
Of all bioethical issues, those that deal with end-of-life treat-
ment decisions in the aged and the incurably ill generate the most 
debate. This is because they directly confront life-and-death 
outcomes, as well as issues of self-determination and health care 
cost. 
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Living Wills 
Patient self-determination is a bioethical principle of recent 
vintage, an outgrowth of American laws governing privacy or 
liberty rights. All competent persons are believed to have a 
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their 
medical care. Autonomy underpins many widely accepted 
Western medical practices such as informed consent and 
do-not-resuscitate orders. It empowers the patient with the 
control of his or her body, even for decisions against medical 
advice. 
When patients become seriously ill, they may become con-
fused, delirious or comatose, and therefore incapable of making 
decisions regarding their treatment. Yet it is important to know 
their wishes, since some treatment options are invasive and 
expensive, and may only prolong the dying process while 
offering little or no reasonable chance of recovery. Patients may 
not want such treatment. · 
A living will is a written document prepared by an individual 
in order to direct future care in the event of medical 
decision-making incapacity. It is one way of preserving and 
respecting the patient's right of self-determination. All 50 states 
have statutes that allow individuals to plan in advance for their 
medical treatment: California was the first with the enactment of 
its Natural Death Actin 1976.7 Hawaii passed its Living Will law 
in 1986, amending it in 1991.8 
Living wills permit patients to forgo life-sustaining treatment 
when they become incurably ill and are no longer able to make 
or communicate their decisions. Patients may specify the refusal 
of specific measures such as mechanical ventilation, blood 
transfusions, dialysis or surgery, or they may choose to forgo all 
life-sustaining treatment. Medical personnel will always con-
tinue to provide comfort care to relieve pain and suffering. 
Written instructions in the form of a living will have two 
practical effects: They inform health care providers of the 
patient's true wishes, and they spare family members the uncer-
tainty and guilt of trying to decide what's best for the patient. The 
underlying disease is allowed to run its natural course. "Allow-
ing to die" is therefore different from active euthanasia or mercy 
killing, where a deliberate act is performed to extinguish life. 
A living will is a witnessed legal document that becomes 
operational when the patient is decisionally incapacitated with 
a terminal illness. Doctors are legally obligated to abide by the 
patient's instructions; it may be revoked at anytime by the 
patient. 
Three aspects of living wills that deserve attention: 
• Living will statutes may be unduly restrictive orvague.-
For example, "terminally ill" in one jurisdiction8 was originally 
defined as death occurring in a "relatively short time." Physi-
cians may not know what ~his means and have adopted the 
definition provided by Medicare the country's health plan for 
senior citizens, which is death occurring within 6 months. In 
some jurisdictions, persis~t>ntlv vegetative states and severe 
irreversible neurological damage do not nualifv since these are 
not terminal conditions. Some laws do not add1 ;ss the withhold-
ing or withdrawing of intravenous hydration or tube feedings. 
For example, Hawaii, initially ambivalent about whether these 
measures constitute "medical treatment," excluded them from 
its 1986 law; an amendment in 1 '1 j 1 now permits the 
discontinuation of artificial hydration and nutrition in terminally 
ill patients, as well as in those with irreversible neurological 
conditions that impair decision-making.8 
• Durable power of attorney (DPA) is superior to a living 
wiii.-A DPA for health care decisions confers legal authority 
regarding medical matters on someone (not necessarily an 
attorney) who is appointed by the principal (patient). This 
authority takes effect when the latter is decisionally incapaci-
tated.9 Appointing a DPA for health care is preferable to execut-
ing a living will because the patient now has a trusted surrogate 
who can faithfully reflect the patient's wishes known to him or 
her or are expressed in a concurrent living will. A living will 
alone is insufficient. It is a static document, made months or 
years prior, that cannot possibly anticipate every conceivable 
clinical situation that might arise in the future. For example, the 
patient may not have considered specific medical measures such 
as antibiotics, artificial nutrition or temporary dialysis. Or a new 
treatment may be imminent. Executing both a DPA and a living 
will gives the patientthe best chance of fully exercising his or her 
self-determination rights when medically incompetent.2 To-
gether, the proxy-decision maker, the patient (speaking through 
his or her living will), and the doctor will decide what is best for 
the patient. 
• Educate patients and doctors.-Despite widespread legis-
lation on advance directives, most Americans have yet to ex-
ecute such a document. The best estimates suggest that less than 
a quarter of the general population have prepared living wills. 
Doctors and nurses, who should know better, are no better off. 10 
Inadequate public education and inertia in executing a legal 
document are the likely reasons. Recent federal legislation 
mandating all hospitals to inform patients of advance directive 
statutes should prove effective. Called the Patient 
Self-Determination Act, 11 the law went into effect in December 
1991. Yet a study of 302 patients before and after implementa-
tion of the Act revealed no difference in patient knowledge. 
Only 6% were able to identify correctly the meaning and use of 
both a D P A and ali ving will, and less than a quarter remembered 
being given this information. 12 It seems a hospital is not the ideal 
place to begin the education process. 
Living wills should be understandable and easy to prepare. 
Model forms should be widely available and should incorporate 
provisions for the appointment of a health care DPA. An 
effective educational strategy may be to encourage or require 
physicians to routinely discuss the subject with their patients 
before they become seriously ill. Special sensitivity is also 
needed in explaining advance directives to certain ethnic or 
religious groups. Blacks, for example, may shy away from 
advance directives for religious reasons or because of a percep-
tion of abuse by and distrust of the medical establishment.13 
Ethics Committees 
In the 1960s, some hospitals in the U.S. set up special commit-
tees to review decisions regarding abortions, renal dialysis, and 
human experimentation. Many of the decisions centered around 
the ethics of autonomy, rationing, or consent, so these early ad 
hoc groups can be considered the forerunners of our present-day 
ethics committees. In 1976, a New Jersey court recommended 
that family and physicians use a hospital ethics committee to 
resolve cases like In re Quinlan (the right to stop life-sustaining 
treatment) rather than seek judgment in court.4 This unusual 
judicial recommendation, the first of its kina ever, provided the 
impetus for the creation of ethics committees across the country. 
The President's Commission's report in 1983 further encour-
aged their formation.2 
-
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In 1984, the federal government promulgated the Baby Doe 
rules to prevent the perceived maltreatment of handicapped 
neonates and infants. 14 The regulations failed to materialize into 
law, but they led to the proliferation of hospital infant care 
review committees, which in tum grew into hospital ethics 
committees. 
About half of the 6,000 U.S. hospitals currently have working 
ethics committees; the percentage is higher in hospitals with 
more than 200 beds. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) deserves some of the credit 
for this phenomenal growth. In 1991 JCAHO, which accredits 
all U.S. health care institutions, wrote into its regulations the 
requirement that "an organization should have in place a mecha-
nism for the consideration of ethical issues arising in the care of 
patients and to provide education to caregivers and patients on 
ethical issues in health care."15 
In addition to ethics committees, hospitals are required by 
federal law to have in place Institutional Review Boards that 
scrutinize research protocols involving human subjects. 16 Fi-
nally, many professional organizations such as the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians, 
and the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology have 
formed committees to establish ethical guidelines and policies 
for their specialties. The American Medical Association, the 
country's leading doctor organization, likewise has such a 
committee which regularly updates and publishes its position on 
ethical issuesY 
What do hospital ethics committees do? Generally, they 
perform three functions: First, they influence policies on ethical 
issues governing patient-care. An example is the hospital DNR 
(do-not-resuscitate) policy. A current policy struggle of ethics 
committees concerns the formulation of a coherent approach to 
futile treatment. Second, ethics committees offer consultations 
to health care providers and families. These clinical consulta-
tions frequently involve difficult treatment decisions. Third, 
hospital ethics committees sponsor teaching programs to edu-
cate their staff and the public. The educational function is the 
least controversial of the three; some have suggested that it 
should be the only legitimate function of ethics committees. 
The roles of the ethics committee should be clearly differen-
tiated from those of hospital legal counsel and its risk manager. 
Notwithstanding their popularity, hospital ethics committees 
have come under increasing fire for their lack of fairness, 
consistency, and effectiveness. It has been said that the main 
value of ethics committees lies in their process and not necessar-
ily their product. 18 Critics also question the appropriateness of 
the move to immunize committee members and participants 
from l~galliability .19 
The mos! controversial aspect of hospital ethics committees is 
their role in clinical consultations: 
• Who sits on ethics committees? -Most scholars are critical 
of committees composed mostly of doctors because of the 
concern that they alone cannot completely represent the patient's 
best interests. Doctor-controlled ethics committees are less 
common today; instead, committees almost universally have 
multidisciplinaf) and lav representation. It is important to have 
lay member~, if only because they compel discussions at an 
everyday understandable level-the same level that is needed to 
meaningfully inform the patient and family. Nurses and social 
workers d~finitely belong on ethics committees, since they 
spend much time with patients and family, gaining special 
-
insight into patient wishes and concerns and family dynamics. 
Theologians, administrators and philosophers sometimes popu-
late ethics committees; they can provide useful perspectives. 
One group appears unpopular: Legal counsel. Perhaps it's a 
reflection of paranoia over lawsuits and legal pronouncements, 
or simply the belief that the law sets mandatory standards, 
whereas ethics is aspirationaP 
Ethics members may be ignorant of ethical principles and 
health care matters. A recent article decried the laissez-faire 
approach to ethics committees, and called for the systematic 
education and training of committee members in order to achieve 
standards aimed at raising the level of accountability .18 
• Who is an ethics consultant? -Suppose a patient refuses a 
lifesaving blood transfusion. Family members are reluctant or 
unable to persuade the patient to change his or her mind. The 
attending physician is reluctant to coerce treatment and calls for 
an ethics consultation. Who can respond? Only doctors with 
training in clinical ethics? The chief of the department? What 
about a non-doctor ethicist or even the entire ethics committee 
if it can respond quickly enough? 
Ethics consultants may review cases on behalf of the 
institution's ethics committee on which they serve, or they may 
offer these specific services without going through a committee. 
The main advantages of a consultant over a committee are: 1) 
first-hand direct contact with the patient, family, and health care 
givers; 2) quick response time; and 3) enhanced accountability. 
Adding a consultant to an ethics committee, therefore, can be 
expected to improve its effectiveness in case reviews.20 
But what training qualifies an individual to be an ethics 
consultant? There is rto U.S. statutory board ofbioethics with the 
authority to certify an individual as a clinical bioethicist. A 
recent survey21 asked 154 "ethics consultants" what they would 
recommend in eight hypothetical variations of the persistent 
vegetative state. The study revealed wide variations in their 
recommendations, pointing to the need for standardization. 
Other studies indicate that the medical fraternity is generally 
suspicious of non-doctors who make recommendations about 
their patients. Ethics consultants who are not medical doctors 
can expect, at least initially, to encounter resistance to their 
presence on hospital wards. 
Finally, should an ethics consultant be paid for services 
rendered. Currently, most ethics consultations are offered as a 
hospital service without charge to the patient. Shouldn't the 
patient or health care insurance payers reimburse the cost of 
clinical ethics services just as they do for other clinical consul-
tations? 
• Who has access to ethics committees?-Ethics consulta-
tions should be patient -oriented rather than physician-oriented. 22 
Ideally, patients and their families as well as all health care 
professionals connected with the case should be able to access 
the hospital ethics committee. However, in many hospitals, only 
members of the medical staff have access, and nurses and 
patients may be excluded. Because an ethical opinion may be 
sought where disagreement exists among doctors, nurses, and 
family, ethics committees should have an "Open door" policy to 
hear all sides of the issue. Patients and others will view commit-
tees that restrict access with suspicion, which in tum undermines 
their credibility and effectiveness. 
• Decisions by bureaucracy.-Those bemoaning the increas-
ing bureaucratization of medical decision-making cite ethics 
committees as one prime example. Dr Mark Siegler, a noted 
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clinical ethicist, has criticized decisions by committees because 
they add to the administrative and regulatory burdens on pa-
tients, families, and their physicians. Committees usurp the 
traditional role and responsibilities of the treating physician, 
replacing him or her with uninvolved moral experts who may 
have serious conflicts of interest such as minimizing hospital 
risk or allocating economic resources more efficiently.23 
Another pitfall is that committees may paradoxically impair 
rather than improve decision-making. The phenomenon of "group 
think" may lead to subconscious pressure on members to reach 
consensus, and to minimize controversy, risks, and objections. 24 
Professor George Annas, arguably America's leading health 
care lawyer specializing in bioethics, is unenthusiastic about 
ethics committees for a different reason. He is concerned that a 
group decision by an ethics committee holds no individual 
responsible or legally accountable; ethics committees, he be-
lieves, should provide "ethical comfort, not ethical cover."25 
Medical Futility 
Consider patients in a persistently vegetative state, which is 
usually caused by prolonged interruption of brain oxygenation. 
Oblivious to their surroundings, such noncognitive patients 
stand no reasonable chance of returning to a sapient state. They 
require supportive treatment, sometimes needing mechanical 
ventilators to help them breathe. In the 70s and 80s, the issue was 
whether doctors could insist on treating such patients against the 
wishes of the family. In America today, the opposite issue 
confronts medical practitioners-the issue of medical futility. 
If it is clear that families can stop treatment, is it also clear they 
can demand non-beneficial care against the doctor's medical 
judgment? Can doctors refuse to provide expensive futile care 
which neither treats nor palliates? Two recent court cases 
suggest there may indeed be such a duty to treat under certain 
circumstances. In the first case, In re Wang lie, 26 the New York 
court upheld the family's request to continue ventilator support 
of Helga Wanglie, an 86-year-old woman in a persistently 
vegetative state who had earlier stated her desire for all 
life-sustaining treatment. In the second case, In the matter of 
Baby J<27 the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed a lower Virginia 
court's decision to honor a mother's request that her comatose 
anencephalic infant (born without a brain) be provided emer-
gency treatment whenever she needed such treatment, instead of 
being allowed to die. 
Because the evolving law appears to favor "pro-life" family 
decisions, physicians, fearing lawsuits, are understandably re-
luctant to reject surrogate demands for ineffective therapy. This 
largely explains the continued use of aggressive futile treatment 
in hospital wards and intensive care units. Extending, ad 
absurdem, this putative duty to treat, doctors even go so far as to 
offer options that are clearly unwarranted, eg, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation for the patient with terminal cancer.lt' sa misread-
ing of the law of informed consent, and an example of defensive 
medicine which, by one estimate, adds $27 billion to annual U.S. 
health costs.28 
Might judges be off the mark in their opinions regarding 
medical futility? The goals of medical practice are to prevent 
illness, to restore health, to alleviate pain and suffering, and to 
rehabilitate. These goals are only served by doing what is 
medically appropriate or indicated. If futile care equals inappro-
priate care, a family's misplaced demand for such treatment 
must necessarily yield to medical judgment. Judges and families 
-
should defer legitimate clinical decisions to the medical profes-
sion. Doctors are bound by the Hippocratic Oath and are trained 
to make sound clinical judgments. They define the standard of 
care, and they should stand by it. 3 This is feasible because: 
• Medical futility is definable.-Simply put, futile treatment 
is that which cannot reasonably be expected to improve a 
patient's quality of life. Under this definition, comfort care, 
which relieves suffering, is never futile. On the other hand, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a comatose terminally ill pa-
tient is. 
Schneiderman and colleagues29 have proposed several defini-
tions of medical futility that are practical and useful. They 
believe physicians should differentiate between treatment that 
merely results in an isolated effect from that which brings about 
a general benefit to the patient as a whole. Treatment that fails 
to provide the general benefit, whether or not it achieves a 
physiological effect, is futile. Treatment that merely preserves 
permanent unconsciousness or condemns the patient to exist-
ence in the intensive care unit can also be considered futile. 
Some insist that for treatment to be deemed futile, it must offer 
zero chance of a favorable outcome. A more practical approach 
is to acknowledge that absolute certainty is unachievable in 
medical prognosis and to accept a no-reasonable-possibility 
standard. Schneidemman et al offer a quantitative definition of 
medical futility: Less than one chance in 100. 
• One way to save medical costs-accept death?-Medical 
expenses are apt to be particularly high at the end of life. About 
30% of all Medicare payments each year are for the 5% of 
beneficiaries who died in that year; about 40% of the medical bill 
in the last year of life is spent in the last month. 30 It has been 
suggested that a good part of these expenditures may be for futile 
invasive treatment rather than for comfort and compassionate 
care, a perversion of high-touch by high-tech. 
Because physicians can never be certain whether or when 
death will occur, some commentators have challenged the view 
that these end-of-life expenses are unnecessary or wasteful. 
They calculate that relatively little savings will result even if we 
take positive steps like advance directives, hospice care, and the 
elimination of futile treatment.31 
Rationing 
Most wealthy nations spend 7% to 9% of their GOP on health 
care. By contrast, the U.S. leads the world by consuming 14%, 
or nearly $1 trillion. Neonatal care in the intensive care unit can 
cost upward of $2,000 a day. Major medical procedures such as 
coronary bypass surgery top $20,000, and organ transplants cost 
even more; when follow-up care and medications are totaled, the 
bill exceeds $100,000. 
Mired in this milieu of medical megabucks are 37 million 
Americans, a quarter of them children, who cannot afford health 
insurance and therefore forgo ready access to health care. 
Prenatal care is patchy, and many children are not properly 
vaccinated. These factors largely account for our high infant 
mortality rate of 9.2 per 1,000. In contrast, Singapore boasts a 
figure of5.5, Canada 7.2, and the U.K. 8.4. Our life expectancy, 
at 75.2 years, trails Canada's 76.4, Singapore's 75.7, and the 
U.K.'s 75.6.32 
Even in a crisis of affordability, no caring society can allow its 
sick to go without medical attention. Ethically we must insist on 
universal access. Yet.America does not wish to surrender its lead 
in biotechnology, medical innovations and quality care. The 
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trick is to satisfy these needs within an affordable health care 
budget, to structure a system that delivers all three: Quality, 
accessibility, and affordability. Can health care ever be like the 
good, fast, and cheap McDonald's hamburger? Or do we believe 
those who tell us that health care, for better or for worse, can only 
serve up any two, but never all three? 
Enter rationing. Many consider this morally indefensible, 
forgetting that we already ration care by implicitly limiting the 
reach of 37 million uninsured Americans. Under one scenario, 
the new rationing will provide coverage irrespective of the 
ability to pay, but what is provided will be basic and adequate, 
not comprehensive. Those who want more will have to pay for 
the extras themselves. Adequate care does not translate into 
everything with the slightest hope of medical benefit. As in the 
family budget, affordability dictates what we might have to do 
without. 
Is providing such a basic package to all, but allowing the 
individual to buy additional coverage, ethically justifiable? This 
is two-tiered medicine. It favors the rich, and it is practiced in 
most countries of the world. We in the U.S. so far have resisted 
its implementation, but the current health care debate centering 
on affordability is forcing us to reconsider the issue. Should 
money buy a second or third opinion, the best available surgeon, 
a private nurse? Surely there are limits. Should it ever be allowed 
to buy a kidney? 
What will the law say about attempts to limit care in the name 
of saving money? In America's litigious society, we can expect 
lawsuits to proliferate. Newsweek recently described lawsuits as 
the "weapon of choice" against those who would limit medical 
services. 33 This past year, Nelene Fox successfully sued 
Health-Net, an HMO, for its denial of a bone-marrow transplant 
to treat her breast cancer. Ignoring defense evidence that such 
treatment was experimental, the jury awarded her $89 million in 
damages.33 
Another recent case provides a useful perspective on the 
subject of rationing. In the summer of 1993, a pair of Siamese 
twins were born to the Lakebergs. The twin sisters, Amy and 
Angela, shared a common heart and liver. In an urgent and 
desperate operation, surgeons in Philadelphia attempted to sepa-
rate the joined organs. They were prepared to sacrifice Amy for 
the infinitesimal chance of saving her sister Angela. Unfortu-
nately both died. The cost of the tragedy was estimated at $1.3 
million. 33 
In caring for its poor and its uninsured, Oregon recently set up 
a list of 696 diagnoses and procedures ranked in order of medical 
priority. The state legislature funded up to number 565, and 
excluded items such as heroic treatments for the incurably ill and 
most types of plastic surgery. Although not without its critics, 
the courageous and realistic Oregon Plan has received approval 
from Washington after being previously spumed by the Bush 
Administration. The nation will be watching closely whether 
Oregon's rationing scheme proves to be a workable model of 
cost-containment in health care delivery.34 
• Age as a criterion for rationing.-Severalleading philoso-
phers in the U.S. have proposed that age be used as a criterion in 
the rationing of medical care, reasoning that such limits are 
justifiable because each citizen would benefit over the course of 
the individual's lifetime (every citizen was once young). Thus, 
age discrimination differs fundamentally from sex or race dis-
crimination since these latter classes would be denied from birth 
an equitable share of health care resources. Callahan35 in particu-
-
lar has made the point that citizens should substitute "commu-
nalism for individualism," and accept death at the end of a 
natural life span both for their own sake and for the sake of 
others. Extending the logic of his argument, he has called for the 
cessation of medical research directed at extending life. 
The fascination with using age as a criterion follows the 
dramatic demographics of aging in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
Currently, those over the age of65 comprise 12% of America's 
population; this figure will rise to 20% by the year 2020. The 
elderly consume a disproportionate share, almost a third, of 
health care spending.36-37 And, in contrast to Asian values,38 
American attitudes tend to glorify youth and devalue the elderly. 
It is not always clear whether these philosophers are talking 
about limiting routine medical care, intensive care, or futile 
treatment of the elderly. Few would wish to limit routine, 
comfort and compassionate care for any patient, young or old. 
On the other hand, it is easy to argue that medical treatment that 
extends life devoid of human qualities should not be undertaken. 
But that argument applies irrespective of age.39 
The matter oflimiting intensive care for the elderly is probably 
what's being contemplated. It deserves closer study. Recent data 
indicate that the long-term outcomes of hospitalized critically ill 
elderly patients are remarkably good.40 Compared to a control 
group (ages 65 to 74), elderly patients 75 years or more did not 
differ in length of hospital stay, hospital charges, mortality at 1 
year, or quality of life. Most were willing to receive intensive 
care again, if necessary. Such results have prompted a call for 
re-examining the common assumptions about health care in the 
elderly.37 
Limiting elderly health care is assumed to result in substantial 
savings. Levinsky has questioned this conventional wisdom,39 
high cost hospital admissions account for less than 3.5% of 
Medicare expenditures; the withholding of all routine medical 
care from the elderly is believed to be necessary before substan-
tial savings can be achieved. Restricting research that extends 
the natural life-span has been criticized as naive, since research 
cannot be compartmentalized (the example is given that penicil-
lin prevents rheumatic fever in the young and extends the lives 
of the elderly with pneumonia). Finally, Levinsky argues that 
the noneconomic costs of a national policy to limit health care 
to the elderly would be substantial, since it is politically unpopu-
lar and is likely to exacerbate the tension between the genera-
tions. 
Euthanasia 
More than any other controversy in health care, euthanasia 
palpably confronts the life-and-death decision. It ranks as one of 
America's premier ethical dilemmas, and its most emotional. 
Supporters of euthanasia assert an individual has the ultimate 
right to choose death, and there is no moral difference between 
allowing a person to die, which is legal, and active euthanasia, 
which is not.41 They point to the medical profession's insensitiv-
ity toward alleviating pain and suffering at the end-of-life as the 
raison d'etre in their demand for death control and death with 
dignity. 
Opponents of euthanasia deny such an absolute right to be 
killed: Allowing the underlying disease to take its course is 
fundamentally different from an overt act whose purpose is to 
extinguish life.42 They also argue that life is sacred and that 
hospice care and better doctor education have resulted in im-
proved comfort measures for the terminally ill. 
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• The slippery-slope argument.-Many fear that legalizing 
euthanasia may unintentionally victimize the weaker members 
of society. What begins as allowing free choice would slide into 
subtle encouragement to end life; mental coercion and involun-
tary euthanasia without explicit patient requests lie short steps 
away. The handicapped, the poor and the aged would be the most 
vulnerable. A review of MDEL (medical decisions concerning 
the end of life) in the Netherlands, where euthanasia is con-
doned, supports this slippery-slope argument.43 The lack of 
explicit request was found in 1,000 patients who were euthanized 
in 1990 to 1991. Such abuse concerns led to the narrow 54 to 46 
rejection of recent aid-in-dying initiatives in Washington and 
California. 44 
The euthanasia assault on the Hippocratic Oath argues ill for 
American society plagued by family rupture, mindless violence, 
and increasing discrimination. While claiming to be 
autonomy-centered, active euthanasia stands to dangerously 
expand the ethical boundaries of rationing and medical futility. 
• The double-effect phenomenon.-Aggressive treatment 
toward abating pain and suffering at life's end may result in an 
earlier death for the patient, since medications such as morphine 
are powerful respiratory depressants. This unintended result of 
accelerating the dying process is not wholly unanticipated. 
Doctors, therefore, worry about the wrongfulness of this so-called 
"double-effect" phenomenon. Physician fear of criminal or civil 
backlash may be the basis for the dramatic under-use of narcot-
ics (both dose and frequency) to alleviate the suffering of the 
dying patient. It has been estimated that in as many as 80% of 
patients, pain is not relieved effectively.45 
Bioethicists have universally considered the morally support-
able double-effect phenomenon to be fundamentally different 
from euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Their reassur-
ance may not be enough. Laws immunizing physicians from 
liability in this area may be necessary to gain the confidence and 
support of an increasingly skeptical profession. A change in 
physician mind-set toward the double-effect phenomenon will 
ensure better comfort care in terminally ill patients. 
• Is legalized euthanasia likely?-Like the abortion fight 
culminating in Roe v. Wade46 more than two decades ago, the 
euthanasia battle is being waged with increasing stridor and 
cacophony. The country appears intensely interested and evenly 
divided on this issue. A how-to monograph on suicide entitled 
Final Exit became a runaway best-seller.47 And a survey of938 
physicians in Washington revealed that a slight majority favored 
legalizing physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in at least 
some situations, although most would be unwilling to partici-
pate in these practices themselves.48 
The recent court verdict absolving Dr Jack Kevorkian, a 
pathologist who assisted in the mercy-killing of 18 patients in 
Michigan, will fuel the national drive to legalize euthanasia. 
Initial rebuffs at the ballot box in California and Washington 
notwithstanding, pro-choice advocates can be expected to re-
double their efforts to achieve their goal. This November, 
Oregonians will be voting on an aid-in-dying initiative that 
sanctions the request for drugs to end life. Liberal Oregon 
supports legalized rationing, and it is home to The Hemlock 
Society, the nation's leading right-to-die organization. Early 
betting favors passage of this initiative. If passed into law, this 
initial victory for supporters oflegalized euthanasia will serve as 
a powerful catalyst for the passage of similar laws across the 
country.** 
Conclusions 
My personal experiences and my reading of the bioethical and 
medicolegal trends in America lead me to offer the following 
overview: 
1. America should be applauded for its insistence on respect 
for patient autonomy, but it should be more willing to 
accommodate physician paternalism. Most of all, it must 
recognize when autonomy ought to yield to societal values 
that preserve the common good. 
2. Lawyers and the courts are overly intrusive in patient-care 
matters. Like Damocles' sword, the law hangs over the 
heads of health care providers, frequently impeding rather 
than fostering their efforts to look after the best interests of 
their patients. 
3. Doctors must not abdicate their duty and privilege as the 
patient's ultimate advocate. 
4. The health care crisis in America is one of affordability 
rather than access. To preserve the excellence of our health 
care system, we simply must restore self-discipline and 
spend within our health care budget. 
5. Equal comprehensive health care for all is an illusion, even 
if it is politically correct. But we must insist on basic 
adequate coverage for all, irrespective of age or the ability 
to pay. 
6. Futile treatment confers no benefit on patients, and wastes 
health care dollars. It should be abandoned. 
7. Overall patient and societal benefit should inform and 
guide the decision to treat, to withhold treatment, and to 
allocate scarce health care resources. 
.. On November 8, 1994, voters in Oregon enacted Measure 16 that legalizes the prescribing of 
medications for terminally ill patients seeking to end their lives. 
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